Scarcity Revenue True Up

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- PJM's proposal would substantially increase energy market revenues and reserve market revenues.
- PJM's proposal does not address resultant overpayment during the four delivery years for which capacity market has cleared: 2019/2020; 2020/2021; 2021/2022; 2022/2023 (will clear prior to offset)
- Result will be overpayment of at least \$1.5 billion per year for four years or \$6.0 billion total.
 - This is likely to be conservatively low estimate.





- PJM's proposal is to use simulation results to calculate net revenue offset for new capacity market auctions, beginning for the auction in 2020, for 2023/2024.
- This would mean that a PJM simulation process would set capacity market prices.
- It is not appropriate for a nontransparent, non explicitly rule based, and nonmarket calculation to set market prices.
- PJM has refused to share simulation output files with the IMM.



- The proposed increase in energy and reserve market revenue to generators is a substitute for capacity market revenue.
 - Capacity market revenue is scarcity revenue.
- PJM has not stated that its goal is to increase total compensation for generation.
- PJM's apparent goal is to shift revenue from the capacity market to the energy and reserve markets.
- The shift of revenue requires additional market design changes to ensure that the shift occurs effectively, equitably and efficiently.

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Scarcity Pricing and the VRR Curve

- The impact on the capacity market demand (VRR) curve needs to be addressed because PJM's proposal is changing the location of scarcity pricing to the energy market.
- The reason for the maximum price on the VRR curve is to incorporate scarcity pricing in the capacity market.
 - Higher of 1.5 * net CONE or gross CONE
- This will no longer be appropriate under PJM's proposal.



Scarcity Pricing and the VRR Curve

- Existing shape would become almost vertical with maximum price equal to gross CONE under PJM's proposal
 - Increases to the net energy and ancillary services offset would decrease net CONE to relatively low levels.
 - If net CONE is zero, existing VRR curve maximum price would equal gross CONE .
- The maximum price on the VRR curve should be set at net CONE.
- Capacity price could be zero under some conditions.




VRR Curves

- VRR curve 1: Actual 2021/2022 VRR
- VRR curve 2: IMM Quadrennial Review proposal
- VRR curve 3: PJM Quadrennial Review proposal
- VRR curve 4: IMM Quad Review; Net CONE = 0; Max price = Gross CONE
- VRR curve 5 IMM Quad Review; Net CONE = 0; Max price = Net CONE



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
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VRR Curves

- VRR curve 1: Actual 2021/2022 VRR
- VRR curve 2: IMM Quadrennial Review proposal
- VRR curve 3: PJM Quadrennial Review proposal
- VRR curve 4: IMM Quad Review; Net Revenue with 10 percent increase in LMP; Max price = Gross CONE
- VRR curve 5 IMM Quad Review; Net Revenue with 10 percent increase in LMP; Max price = Net CONE

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First Four Years Under PJM's Proposal

- PJM's proposal will result in an overpayment of at least \$1.5 billion per year for four years or \$6.0 billion total during the transition period.
- There needs to be a true up for the first four delivery years or a delay in implementation.
- The true up issues would be much smaller if the IMM's proposal were adopted.



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Forward Looking Offset

- If revenues are to be shifted from the capacity market to the energy market, there must be a clear and verifiable mechanism to ensure that the shift occurs effectively, equitably and efficiently.
- Without a forward looking energy and ancillary services offset in the capacity market, the capacity price and the energy price cannot reach an equilibrium.
- A forward looking energy and ancillary services offset is required for the modified ORDC approach to work efficiently.



- The true up for the first four delivery years should return excess capacity revenues to customers.
- In the absence of a forward looking energy and ancillary services offset, the true up for the following years should also return scarcity revenues to customers unless a resource's scarcity revenues exceed the scarcity revenues of the reference unit.





True Up Transition Mechanism

- Scarcity rents in energy and reserve markets are the portion of revenues directly attributable to the scarcity price adder to LMP.
- ORDC scarcity rents were not anticipated in previously cleared capacity auctions.
- Calculate scarcity rents for the reference CT using actual delivery year prices to determine what the accurate E&AS offset would have been.
 - Calculate cumulative scarcity rents each day and a final number at the end of the delivery year.
 - True up delivery year capacity payments by the calculated amount. www.monitoringanalytics.com

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