



Proper Approach to Mark-to-Auction

PJM Credit Subcommittee

28 September 2018

Mark-to-Auction (MTA)

Problem with Proposals A-F

- Each of proposals A-F has a flaw that makes each inconsistent with best practice in credit and counterparty risk management
- Under A-F, a deteriorating forward FTR position would only require additional collateral once the initial path-based and per-MWh collateral was exhausted
- A-F proposals all set collateral as:
 - Max (Path-based, per-MWh, MTA)
- If the MTA is binding, PJM will have NO collateral or cushion for further losses
 - Proper margining disincentivizes doubling down on bad bets



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Basic Margining Concepts

- Margining is standard industry practice for all PJM participants involved in commercial trading with counterparties
 - The principles are well-established and laid out in ISDA/EEI/Futures Agreement margining protocols
- Under ISDA/EEI/Futures:
 - Collateral = Initial Margin + Variation Margin
 - **Initial margin** is the collateral associated with holding a specific set of positions (i.e. path-based or per-MWh)
 - **Variation margin** is collateral associated with the mark-to-market or MTA. I.e. When the fair value of a position deteriorates, the losing party has to give collateral to their counterparty to bring the position back to fair value
- In the case of PJM FTRs, anticipated ARR revenue can off-set MTA losses in margining



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
MTA as an Adder

- Calculating MTA as an adder rather than the max would bring PJM's credit policy in line with standard industry practice:
 - Collateral = initial margin + variation margin, i.e.:
 - Collateral (G) = $\text{Max}(\text{Path-based, per MWh}) + \text{MTA}$ **Correct!**
 - Collateral (A-F) = $\text{Max}(\text{Path-based, per MWh, MTA})$ **Not Correct!**
- Treating MTA as an adder ensures that the initial margin cushion is reestablished after a MTA loss
- Under A-F, MTA losses completely erode the initial margin cushion before asking for more collateral



Mark-to-Auction (MTA) Example

- Assume a set of FTR positions where the initial collateral requirement (Path-based or per MWh) is \$5 Million (mm).
 - At t_0 , collateral is \$5 mm and the cost of the positions equals their mark (MTA = 0)
 - At the next auction t_1 , the MTA loss is \$2.5 mm, eroding the initial margin
 - At the next auction t_2 , the MTA is \$5 mm. Now there is no collateral to cover the next move under A-F



			Margining Requirement		Amount of Cushion for Future Losses	
	Initial Margin	Variation Margin	A-F	G	A-F	G
	t_0	5	0	5	5	5
t_1	5	2.5	5	7.5	2.5	5
t_2	5	5	5	10	0	5

- In order to keep PJM's exposure constant, MTA must be added to the initial requirement, dollar for dollar as soon as the forward FTR portfolio is out of the money

