



Residual Auction Revenue Rights

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- Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) prorated in Stage 1B of the annual ARR allocation maybe allocated residual ARRs on a monthly basis
 - New upgrades and monthly re-serviced outages

- Residual ARR paths could receive negative values based on monthly FTR clearing prices

- Stakeholders are interested in exploring enhancements to reduce customer exposures to negatively priced residual ARRs

- Package A


- Proposed by Exelon and Direct Energy
- Requires PJM to run another SFT proration with all negatively valued bids removed
- Can not be started until the monthly FTR auction is final

- Package B

- Proposed by PJM staff
- Requires ARR holders to notify PJM if they wish to remove ARR bids from the monthly allocation
- Option to exclude will occur each month (include is default)



Residual ARRs could be positively or negatively valued based on the monthly FTR Auction clearing prices. This is the only relationship between the two markets.

Incremental PJM System Capability





Residual Monthly Allocation

ARRs
Allocated
(MWs)



Monthly FTR Auction

FTRs Awarded
To Bidders
(MWs & Price)



- Residual ARR target credits are netted daily with Annual ARR target credits within a portfolio
- Net negative portfolios are a liability to the holder
 - Not reassigned if load shifts away from the LSE
- If sufficient FTR Auction revenues are collected for a day, ARR Credits equal ARR Targets for all ARR holders
 - Remaining Auction Revenues from each day get included in the End-of-Month allocation of Congestion Credits to FTR Holders

- It is possible PJM does not collect enough FTR Auction revenue to fulfill all ARR Targets for a day, although this has never happened
 - Example: If Annual ARR Allocation did not model a Major Long Term Emergency outage that was included in Annual FTR (i.e. outage started after Annual ARR but before Annual FTR)
- If this were to happen, negative valued ARRs would be collected first to increase the proration to positive ARR Targets
- Unfulfilled ARR Targets would get uplifted at the end of the planning period as part of the existing uplift process

- Revenue collected to fund FTR Target credits:
 - Day-ahead congestion revenue
 - Balancing congestion revenue (*subject to change*)
 - Market-to-market payments (*subject to change*)
 - FTR Auction revenue surplus
 - After all ARR Targets are fulfilled

- FTR Auction revenue and surplus values should not significantly change with the removal of counter flow ARR
- SFT will clear less prevailing flow MWs to offset the removal of counter flow MWs
- ARR portfolio values could be different for each member, although impact to total FTR Auction surplus bucket should be minimal
 - Possible +/- change due to ARR paths not being equal and opposite

Potential Impacts:

- Prevailing Flow Residual ARR
- Less will clear since counter flows are removed from the SFT
- ARR Portfolio values could change, although total for PJM should be minimal

Less Possible Impacts:

- Full Funding of ARR Target credits
- ARR Target credits have always been 100% funded

No Impacts:

- FTR Auction clearing prices
- Total PJM FTR funding


Exelon/Direct Energy Package A

- Rerun Residual ARR SFT once monthly FTR market clears
 - Remove all negative valued paths
 - Administrative burden to do this in less than a week


PJM Package B

- Opt-out option for members each month
 - Opt-out is a path-level selection prior to the first SFT
 - Gives ARR holder option to include path rather than PJM zeroing out

Residual ARR Count by Month



Residual ARR Cleared Count by Month





Appendix – Residual ARR Packages and Educational Material

- Package A

- Proposed by Exelon and Direct Energy
- Requires PJM to run another SFT proration with all negatively valued bids removed
- Can not be started until the monthly FTR auction is final

- Package B

- Proposed by PJM staff
- Requires ARR holders to notify PJM if they wish to remove ARR bids from the monthly allocation
- Option to exclude will occur each month (include is default)

- Based on the current monthly FTR schedule, performing a second iteration of the monthly Residual ARR market will require significant administrative work in only a few days
- Adjusting the monthly FTR schedule will have multiple effects including:
 - Base case set-up time for PJM
 - Availability of FTR auction user data postings
 - Credit timeline impacts and potential for locking credit longer than normal
 - Potential member impacts
- PJM would prefer to give members option to include bid rather than zero out

- Provide flexibility for ARR holders to remove bids prior to the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) run each month
 - Gives ARR holders option each month whether or not to include ARR bids for evaluation
 - Does not require significant additional administrative work
 - Will not require adjusting FTR/ARR monthly market timelines

- ARR are allocated to Network & Firm Transmission Service Customers
- ARR entitle the holder to receive an allocation of FTR Auction revenues
- ARR are reassigned on a proportional basis within a zone as load switches between LSEs within the planning period
- ARR must be simultaneously feasible
- Residual ARR may be available within a planning period for increased transmission capability


- ARRs prorated in Stage 1B of the Annual Allocation may be allocated Residual ARRs for the following:
 - Increased transmission capability made available by certain transmission upgrades made during the planning year that were not modeled in the Annual ARR Allocation
 - Increased transmission capability made available for periods when Annual ARR modeled transmission outages are not out of service

- Residual ARR MWs plus previously awarded Stage 1 and Stage 2 MWs cannot exceed the Network Service Peak Load value for a particular participant
- Residual ARRs are effective the first month the increased transmission capability is modeled in the Monthly FTR Auction
- Economic value of Residual ARRs are based on the MW amount and the nodal clearing price difference between the source and sink nodes for the FTR Obligations resulting from each monthly FTR Auction the Residual ARR is effective

- Market is created with prorated stage 1B requests from Annual Allocation
 - All ARR requests from stage 1B that did not fully clear
- Proration is done manually by operator until violated facilities are minimized as much as possible
 - Constraint basis – residual requests that impact violated constraints are prorated

- Residual ARRs are valued based on the nodal clearing prices from the corresponding monthly FTR Auction
- Results are posted in eFTR roughly same time as monthly FTR Auction
- Residual ARRs will shift with load within a zone
- Settlements calculates a daily rate – billed weekly evenly throughout month

Residual ARR Credit by Month



Market	Residual MW Total	Total Value (Annual)*	Total Value (Monthly)
2014/2015 ARR	22,532.90	\$ 4,894,781.83	\$ 8,160,918.27
2015/2016 ARR	37,043.80	\$ 8,138,975.75	\$ 8,620,612.69

**Represents the total cleared Residual ARR MWs priced at the average 4-round annual clearing prices divided by 12.*